At 6am on Tuesday August 27, 1985 Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro announced in a nationwide broadcast that Buhari had been overthrown in a bloodless military coup. After having a champagne breakfast to toast their success, the plotters’ inner caucus held a meeting at Bonny Camp to flesh out details of the new leadership. The meeting was attended by the following officers who arrived dressed in combat fatigues: Babangida, Maj-Gen Sani Abacha, Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro, Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed (head of military intelligence), Navy Commander Murtala Nyako**, Lt-Col Ahmed Abdullahi (Minister of Communications), Lt-Col Tanko Ayuba (commanding officer – Nigerian army signal corps), Lt-Col John Shagaya*** (commanding officer – 9th mechanised brigade, Ikeja)*, Lt-Col Anthony Ukpo, Major Abubakar Umar (Administrator of the Federal Housing Authority).
*The 9th mechanised brigade was formerly commanded by Sani Abacha.
** Currently the Governor of Adamawa State.
*** Currently PDP Senator for Plateau North.
Nigerians were kept in the dark about the new leader until Maj-Gen Sani Abacha made a follow up broadcast at 3.30pm to announce that Babangida had been appointed the new leader. Babangida said he was unanimously chosen to lead by the new caucus without any disagreement. After Abacha’s broadcast a press briefing was held with over 100 journalists. Babangida’s old classmate Vatsa was in Saudi Arabia when Babangida took over. When he returned to Nigeria, he went to pledge his loyalty to Babangida. Now that his course mate was Head of State, Vatsa again assumed he had reached the end of the road and submitted his letter of retirement. Babangida rejected his retirement and retained him as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory.
THE “CAUCUS”
The new regime included several trusted and loyal officers who served under Babangida during his days as commander of the armoured corps. He also did not make the same mistake as Buhari by failing to reward the officers who were instrumental in getting him to power. The two senior officers that were the public face of the coup (Maj-Gen Abacha and Brigadier Dogonyaro) were appointed Chief of Army Staff and GOC of the 3rd armoured division respectively. He also included relatively junior officers from the coup in the AFRC (Lt-Cols Shagaya, Halilu Akilu, Tanko Ayuba and Raji Rasaki). Other Lt-Cols that were instrumental to the coup were also awarded by being appointed Military Governors (Lt-Cols John Mark Inienger, Yohanna Madaki, David Mark, Sambo Dasuki, and Majors Abubakar Umar and Abdulmumuni Aminu) or being appointed to the Federal Executive Council (Brigadier Jerry Useni and Lt-Cols Ahmed Abdullahi and Anthony Ukpo). He could not have got to power without these men and they remained his support base and the spine of his regime. This inner caucus was reinforced by Babangida’s colleagues and old school mates from Bida whom he planted around him in the concentric circle immediately adjacent to the coup caucus. The Bida alumni included Maj-Gens Mamman Vatsa and Gado Nasko – both of whom were in the Federal Executive Council. Only those who risked their lives for him and who were trusted were allowed within his corridors of power.
Babangida’s constant gap toothed smile and genuine bonhomie was a welcome departure from the stern glacial countenance of Buhari and Idiagbon. His charm was also enough to disarm the most cynical sceptic. However when it came to security and his personal survival, Babangida’s “Mr Nice Guy” image had its limits. Babangida was security conscious to the point of paranoia. His paranoia stemmed from his experience as an expert coup plotter over three decades. He later revealed in an interview with Tell Magazine that he had been involved in every successful coup in Nigeria’s history – making him the Nigerian army’s most prolific coup plotter. He was well aware that others in the army were willing to take him on:
“When I became the President, there were about 23 of us who were the coup plotters at that time and immediately that coup was successful, I sat the 23 of us together and said: congratulations, we made it but remember one thing, just like we took up guns and toppled a government we also have to watch because somebody would one day want to topple us and this is because I understood the nature of the Nigerian person.”
FRIENDS FALL OUT
It did not take long for Babangida’s prediction to materialise. Babangida’s rise to power was followed the customary purge of personnel whose loyalty could not be guaranteed. However, Babangida had not purged thoroughly enough. In early December 1985, rumours of a coup plot began circulating in military and political circles. With the government making no announcement on the allegations, several names were mentioned as alleged instigators of a coup. The rumours swept around the barracks too and the name of Mamman Vatsa (Minister of the Federal Capital Territory) crept up. The rumours got to Vatsa’s orderly who did not know how to approach his boss about such a sensitive issue. The orderly therefore disclosed the rumours to Vatsa’s wife, who in turn urged her husband to talk the issue out with Babangida.
Babangida and Vatsa had been friends since boyhood and were old classmates in school, having attended the Bida Middle School together. They were also course mates from their cadet days having enlisted in the Nigerian Military Training College on the same day, commissioned into the army on the same day and holding equal rank and seniority to each other. In the company of two of their mutual friends (one of whom was Gado Nasko), Vatsa met with Babangida and asked him how he could suspect his own friend of coup plotting. According to Babangida Vatsa asked him “You heard I was planning a coup and couldn’t even ask me. What kind of friend are you?” Babangida replied “I didn’t believe it or are you planning a coup?” Vatsa replied in the negative.
The coup rumours were so wild that even Nasko’s name was being peddled as a suspect by rumour mongers. Babangida refused to believe Nasko was involved and said “I don’t like to hear this nonsense.” The matter was forgotten until the ultra security conscious Babangida became convinced that there was a genuine coup plot. At this stage, Vatsa was likely to escape with his life since Babangida was unsure of his guilt. However, Vatsa made a crucial mistake. According to Babangida:
“While the investigations were going on, the investigators said they wanted to take him into Intercell (Interrogation Centre), but I insisted that Vatsa should not be treated like others, not while I was the head of government. First he was (and still is) my friend, secondly, he is a General. I told them the best I could allow him was for him to be restricted to his house….then there was an attempt to escape through the hole of an air conditioner and that’s where we had to concede to put him in the cell.”
THE SUSPECTS
On December 27, 1985, the Information Minister Lt-Col Anthony Ukpo named the coup suspects:
Maj-Gen Mamman Vatsa
Brigadier Malami Nassarawa
Group Captain Ita David Ikpeme
Group Captain Salaudeen Latinwo
Lt-Col Musa Bitiyong
Lt-Col Moses Effiong
Lt-Col Michael Iyorshe
Lt-Col Emmanuel Obeya
Lt-Col Christian Oche
Major Daniel Bamidele
Major D. Edwin-West
Wing Commander Ben Ekele
Wing Commander Adamu Sakaba
Squadron Leader Martin Luther
INVESTIGATIONS
Ikpeme and Latinwo were former Military Governors. Ikpeme formerly governed Ondo state, and Latinwo formerly governed Kwara state. Ikpeme and Latinwo were subsequently released after interrogation and were and not tried. Nassarawa was the commandant of the army’s infantry school in Jaji, and one of the surviving northern officers that staged a mutiny in July 1966. Additionally it was the first time that air force and navy officers were accused of coup plotting. A Special Investigation Panel headed by Sani Sami was tasked with investigating the coup. The panel also included police officer Alhaji Gambo Jimeta, Group Captain Anthony Ikhazobor and the panel secretary was Lt-Col Ajibola Kunle Togun. As a result of these investigations over 100 other officers were arrested and interrogated. Eventually in addition to the 14 officers above, Lt.-Col J.O Onyeke, Captain G.I L Sese, and Lt K.G. Dakpa were also implicated and included in the list of officers to be tried by a Special Military Tribunal. Solidarity rallies were held in support of Babangida. These solidarity rallies would become a common feature of the military regime that succeeded him.
Next Part: The Vatsa Affair: “From detention the prolific writer Vatsa wrote a detention diary every day to chronicle his ordeal. When he didn’t have paper he wrote on toilet rolls and handkerchiefs which were smuggled out. Investigators searched Vatsa’s house thoroughly, going through his massive library and opening up his books. They were excited by the presence of two locked safes in Vatsa’s house”.
... to be continued.
No comments:
Post a Comment